America Enmeshed

Protestors in Cairo, during the disruption of domestic
internet traffic, capture images on their mobile phones.
Copyright NY Daily News

'Amid this unprecedented surge in connectivity, we must also recognize that these technologies are not an unmitigated blessing. These tools are also being exploited to undermine human progress and political rights. Just as steel can be used to build hospitals or machine guns, or nuclear power can either energize a city or destroy it, modern information networks and the technologies they support can be harnessed for good or for ill. The same networks that help organize movements for freedom also enable al-Qaida to spew hatred and incite violence against the innocent. And technologies with the potential to open up access to government and promote transparency can also be hijacked by governments to crush dissent and deny human rights.' 


'On the one hand, anonymity protects the exploitation of children. And on the other hand, anonymity protects the free expression of opposition to repressive governments. Anonymity allows the theft of intellectual property, but anonymity also permits people to come together in settings that gives them some basis for free expression without identifying themselves.'
--Hillary Clinton, Remarks on Internet Freedom, Newseum, Washington, D.C, 21 January, 2010


Daniel Finkelstein's article in the London Times and in particular his comment, 'I desire that the President of the United States proves to be a ditherer, a weakling and a fool. I have suddenly realised that if he isn't, if Barack Obama is better than that, we're all in a whole heap of trouble', is indicative of the malaise in which punditry has found itself during this upheaval in the middle east and maghrib. In the aftermath of 9.11, experts bemoaned the paucity of confident leaders that could drive forward a cogent, balanced response to the tragedy and refuse to be drawn into an emotional, ill-conceived reaction that ultimately played directly into the hands of the very actors who had planned the attacks. 


Finkelstein laters qualifies his position by arguing that if Obama is in fact erudite and certain on the world stage, then his withdrawal of American planes from offensive action in Libya represents - rather than uncertain policy and vacillation - the first step in a return to American isolationism. Further, Finkelstein reverts to history, to the post-World War II foreign policy elites that shaped economic interventionism in Europe to assert that the world needs America as its policeman. In fact, the world has changed since the Marshall Plan and Bretton Woods. Pearl Harbor may have shown that a state could attack an American base, but 9.11 demonstrated that its position in the world whether it chooses to pursue isolationism or aggressive imperialism is part of a global nexus of unseen cause, myriad effects and that the rise of the non-state actor reorientates the world of state sovereignty. 


Obama has relentlessly shown his desire for engagement, whether with his Cairo speech in June 2009 in which he articulated a new era of cooperation, saying, 'I have come here to seek a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world; one based upon mutual interest and mutual respect; and one based upon the truth that America and Islam are not exclusive, and need not be in competition. Instead, they overlap, and share common principles – principles of justice and progress; tolerance and the dignity of all human beings,' Or at the United Nations, in September 2009, when he asserted that, 'The United States stands ready to begin a new chapter of international cooperation -- one that recognizes the rights and responsibilities of all nations'.


This engagement is partly ideology and partly a recognition that America stands in the middle of a giant web of connectivity. China's relative economic rise places even greater emphasis on American foreign policy, particularly as the former is pursuing an unabashed resource grab in Africa. The relative decline of American power is heralded in every new edition of Foreign Affairs, in which academics and policy-makers lament the draining wars pursued under the Bush administration, undertaken whilst sleeping Asian giants conducted various soft power offensives to secure mineral drilling rights across the globe (for the contrary, optimistic view of America's current trajectory, see Joseph Nye in a late 2010 Foreign Affairs article). 


Given this 'majority-view pessimism' it's little wonder that there has been no coherent voice emerge upon the matter of the middle east and maghrib uprisings. After all, what exactly are they? What will be the identity of the states that appear in their place? How will they impact upon the already precarious positions of American, Russia and the geographically adjacent Europe? In fact, the only unequivocal spin-off from the uprisings thus far has been to create a new impetus in the tech-world for mesh-networks. Mubarak's decision to close all domestic internet and telecommunication traffic in late January to combat the use of social media sites to coordinate the uprising was a seminal moment in history. It demonstrated both the coagulating power of instantaneous, free messaging as an instrument for protest, and it showed the ability of a 'democratically-elected' dictator to control communication among his people. 


Mubarak's play was a one time deal that didn't pay off. Ever since, the tech world has become galvanized. Shervin Pishevar wrote an important blogpost at the end of February entitled 'Humans are the Routers' in which he delineated a trajectory that could effectively prevent a regime from removing its population from the Net. The past two months have seen a rapid rise in the software/firmware associated with mesh-networking, which in theory could use mobile phones as nodes in a local platform to connect to Internet network satellites. The evolution has been conducted at a startling pace. Start-up dollars are already in place and OpenMesh has aligned with various other companies to create a software/firmware partnership. Mobiles and networks are the very latest idea in Net development, with some work having been done on this in late 2010. What it demonstrates is that technology, the ability to communicate and evolve a networked structure are being developed at paces that outstrip political action and response. The fallout from the uprisings hasn't even started but already the technology that wasn't there before is being built. The Net abhors a wall. 


I for one want Obama to be a strong leader and assertive. He has already demonstrated an understanding of the networked nature of the twenty-first century and a knowledge too that YouTube just may be the most important news broadcaster of our time. With a mobile phone, everyone is a potential reporter. Kilcullen in his 28 Articles, is instructive: 

‘Remember the global audience. One of the biggest differences between the counterinsurgencies our fathers fought and those we face today is the omnipresence of globalized media. Most houses in Iraq have one or more satellite dishes. Web bloggers, print, radio and television reporters and others are monitoring and commentating on your every move.’

It's obvious that Obama doesn't want American planes engaged in bombing Libya, with the possibility of inflammatory images of civilian casualties on the ground that this could entail. That he has removed planes from the Libya action doesn't mean he wants, or even can, remove America from the world stage rather it shows he understands that military action in civilian theatres has consequences. 'Kinetic' activity can lead to severe, unintended consequences: When the Egyptian Islamic Jihad exploded a bomb by prime-minister Atef Sidiqi's armoured car in 1993, he was unhurt. Yet the blast killed a 12 year-old schoolgirl, Shayma Abdel-Halim. The death resonated with the population. When her coffin was carried through the streets of Cairo, mourners shouted, 'Terrorism is the enemy of God'. The backlash against the organization was severe and precipitated Ayman al-Zawahiri seeking closer ties with al-Qaeda.

If Obama doesn't understand that kinetic operations have the propensity to cause myriad consequences, then his staff do. Iraq and Afghanistan have been laboratories for the insurgent and the counter-insurgent, a cauldron of improvisation and evolution, with the Internet being the medium of choice for message. Obama is just careful how he chooses to engage and in which theatres he wants his nation to go kinetic. So don't worry Finkelstein, America is enmeshed.


Anne-Marie Slaughter's (moderator) Panel Discussion on Internet Freedom, 21 Jan, 2010 



Further.
16+ Projects & Initiatives Building Ad Hoc Wireless Mesh Networks
OpenMesh Project
Connection
Hyperactivist
Global Network Initiative is a voluntary effort by technology companies who are working with nongovernmental organizations, academic experts, and social investment funds to respond to government requests for censorship. The initiative goes beyond mere statements of principles and establishes mechanisms to promote real accountability and transparency.

Daniel Finkelstein

Karzai in the Summer

'There are only two or three human stories, and they go on repeating themselves as fiercely as if they had never happened before'
-- Willa Cather

In the wake of the mob killings in Mazar-i-Sharif, pundits have expressed concern that this area of apparent relative security - now with its obvious underlying volatilty - is due to be one of the seven regions handed over to the Afghan army in June of this year. In fact, since the object of ire was the United Nations (as a not-too-convincing substitute for an evangelical American clergyman who burnt the Koran and uploaded its trial to YouTube for immediate global reach) it seems as if handing over this location to the Afghan army is actually a positive step.

The mob numbered several hundred according to newspaper accounts of the atrocity and suggests that at all levels, this foreign intervention to secure self-government, the great paradox of nation-building, is failing to gain the trust of the heterogenous population. Afghanistan and the Karzai government is an epic fallacy that threatens to unravel at any moment. We in the West assume that because elections were held, however fraudulently, that there is now a represented population and an accountable elite, a dynamic between the two of reciprocity. But the elections served only to legitimate a government, any government in order to ostensibly demonstrate progress towards a Western democratic model. The Karzai government is in no way similar to any nation-state system in the West. The Karzai government cannot, and possibly does not want to, be responsive to the needs of the citzens. It cannot enforce security on the ground and it cannot, without the foreign organizations that dominate the intellectual and kinetic infrastructure in the country, enact change.

The event in Mazar-i-Sharif represents an artificially orientated faultline that jihadists have been trying to exacerbate for a generation. How the United Nations is meant to represent the Koran-burning pastor is indicative of the vague lines that militants will use in attempts to coerce the population. The burning happened on March 20th and garnered almost no media publicity. It has been two weeks since then. According to interviewed UN personnel after the attack, security in Afghanistan has deteriorated in the past five years suggesting that the ISAF is losing the monopoly on violence. There are not enough Afghan troops, numerically, to ensure security across the country, and the neo-Taliban seem motivated and creative in their insurgency. 

The pastor was warned against burning the Koran on September 11th of last year by both Obama and Petraeus, the latter informing him that it would endanger American lives. Instructive, that Petraeus should appeal to nationalist sentiment rather than religious. Petraeus did not suggest that Christian lives would be imperilled. In the end, the odd saga has been the apparent catalyst for an incident that has reignited debate about the immediate future in Afghanistan. No wonder that the US has chosen to pull out of combat missions for the Libyan no-fly zone - all action can in this world of globalized social media catalyse myriad responses.

Leaving Libya

'The inescapable paradox of intervention is that it aims to bring about self-government through benevolent foreign autocracy'

--Chesterton, 2005, 1

'If the enemy is to be coerced, you must put him in a situation that is even more unpleasant than the sacrifice you call on him to make. The hardships of the situation must not be merely transient - at least not in appearance. Otherwise, the enemy would not give in, but would wait for things to improve'.
--Clausewitz 

'No-one starts a war-or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so-without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it'.

--Clausewitz  

'We must stop an authoritarian regime from repressing its people in Europe at the end of the 20th century. We have a moral duty to do so. The responsibility is on our shoulders and we will fulfill it. All efforts to achieve a negotiated, political solution to the Kosovo crisis having failed, no alternative is open but to take military action'.

--Javier Solana, NATO Secretary General, Brussels, Belgium, 23 Mar 1999

It isn't just the lead actors in the UNSC resolution 1973, the US, UK and France that didn't clearly define an exit strategy; the lack of viable exit strategy is also the paramount concern for the estimated 140 000 refugees gathering at Libya's western (Tunisian) and eastern (Egyptian) borders. Germany has pledged 1 million euros to assist in humanitarian relief, which is 1.4 million dollars - amounting to ten dollars per refugee which quantitatively indicates the scale of the problem. The World Food Programme has mobilised US$39.2 million to provide 'food assistance to over one million people in Libya, Egypt and Tunisia and moved 6 000 metric tonnes of food to Libya's eastern border. Conflicting reports from and around Misrata suggest a rapidly shifting balance of power in the city, amidst rumours of atrocities.

Thus it seems perhaps premature to talk of the negotiating table, but the African Union on Friday hosted talks with Libyan delegates in Ethiopia and called for a transition period in Libya that would lead to elections. It's infectious, and the 'coerced democratic wave' for Libya didn't necessarily begin on that continent. Anders Rasmussen, secretary general of NATO has been stating the case for Libyan democracy for a month. Sallust wrote at the time of Caesar that 'few men desire freedom, the most desire nothing more than fair masters'. The reaction is only the beginning. At the end of the colonial era, the liberation from colonial rule did not reject the geography on which the colonies had been founded. Colonially formed territories were turned de facto into nation-state spaces but rule of space, where there is no accountability is easier than government of space, the latter including some form of representation of the public and negotiation between elite and mass. The spaces of Tunisia and Egypt face this problem now attempting to introduce, artificially, relations of reciprocity between the governing classes (which will have to be 'created' in order to develop functional unity) and the governed.

Again this is really a protest against tyranny and its ability to disenfrancise the populus, rather than a rebellion for democracy. There exists this fallacious idea that was perhaps borne of neoconservatism that if only the nation can get to elections, then it will have reached a tipping point and democracy will be assured. This is such a dangerous goal because it ensures nothing. To work for elections as the endpoint against tyranny is Western arrogance in its political systems. Our Western societies are democratic because of the pluralising interests that they have been able to secure and the competition that exists among them. Elections in and of themselves do not guarantee democracy if they are only mechanisms for legitimating governments which, once elected, are not responsive to the needs of the citizens. 

Rasmussen talks more of 'freedom' than he does of 'democracy' though talks grandly of the latter also. But what Libya will need in the coming months far more that freedom is security. Liberty must balance with safety or it will slip into anarchy because from this conflagration, myriad interested actors will emerge. A state of nature with a no-fly zone is still a state of nature. So what are we pinning our hopes on? Actually, I have a pretty good idea that two words did the rounds in the Cabinet Office Briefing Room A before Britain pushed hard for a no-fly zone; Kosovo and Iraq. Both saw strategic success enjoyed by the implementation solely of air-power into the theatre. 

The US, assisted by the UK and France enacted two no-fly zones in Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War without resorting to UN backing, over the Shia dominated South (August 26, 1992, extended further north, Septemter 3, 1996) and the Kurdish North (April 8, 1991 under resolution 688, supported by 15 000 Western troops to create a 'safe haven' - they stayed two months). This was in response to massacres that Saddam was ordering against these regions in response to uprisings that were begun on the back of empty-promises, or 'political rhetoric' from the United States. Those no-fly zones were maintained until the commencement of the invasion in 2003. For the twelve year duration, only two blackhawk helicopters were lost over Iraq, and that was a friendly fire incident.

Kosovo was 78 days of intensive bombing in 1999 that apparently brought Milosevic to the negotiating table, at the cost of no NATO lives, precipitating myriad encomia such as this from John Keegan, 'I didn't want to change my beliefs, but there was too much evidence accumulating to stick to the article of faith. It now does look as if air power has prevailed in the Balkans, and that the time has come to redefine how victory in war may be won'. (For the most measured critique of Kosovo, see Byman and Waxman, 'Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate', International Security, 2000, 24(4), pp.5-38). So there's historical precedent, recent precedent, that NATO does no-fly zones and air assault and does them well. In Iraq, it prevented further massacres and in Kosovo, it was a major factor in bringing Milosevic to the table. The air theatre, the third dimension in a three-dimensional conflict, is where the technological superiority of NATO forces is most keenly observed (Consider too, the impunity with which American drones operate in the NWFP on the Afghan border). So far so good.

And what other lessons could be learned? Nigel White, in critiquing the US stance on the Iraqi no-fly zone has written that 'although the norm for states is one of non-intervention, with the possible exception of the controversial, and generally frowned upon, doctrine of humanitarian intervention to protect basic human rights,20 the United Nations is not so restricted. Attempts were made in 1945 to embed the principle of absolute sovereignty into the UN Charter. However, the atrocities committed by Nazi Germany led to the dilution of the principle21 of non-intervention in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter which states:

Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State ; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

(Nigel White, 'Commentary on the Protection of the Kurdish Safe-Haven: Operation Desert Strike', J. Conflict Security and Law, 1996, 2(1), 197-204)

But it seems strange that Libya dominates the headlines in world media when, in all the interviews I have conducted recently with military personnel, one issue has been consistently raised - Afghanistan, summer 2011. Many in the armed forces see this summer as a vital one for the transition timetable in the country - when the crops are eight to nine feet high in the green zone around the Helmand river, the cover for the insurgents is increased by orders of magnitude. From a peak in 2009, beaten back in 2010, these coming months in 2011 will be vital for the ISAF and the Afghan army against the neo-taliban and related insurgent networks. So to see it lose so much ground in the media is a concern.

More:

Chantal Mouffe, 'The Return of the Political', London: Verso, 2005. 

Mixed Signals

'Relevant questions include: Is the political objective we seek to achieve important, clearly defined and understood? Have all other nonviolent policy means failed? Will military force achieve the objective? At what cost? Have the gains and risks been analyzed? How might the situation that we seek to alter, once it is altered by force, develop further and what might be the consequences? As an example of this logical process, we can examine the assertions of those who have asked why President Bush did not order our forces on to Baghdad after we had driven the Iraqi army out of Kuwait. We must assume that the political objective of such an order would have been capturing Saddam Hussein. Even if Hussein had waited for us to enter Baghdad, and even if we had been able to capture him, what purpose would it have served?'

'We should always be skeptical when so-called experts suggest that all a particular crisis calls for is a little surgical bombing or a limited attack. When the "surgery" is over and the desired result is not obtained, a new set of experts then comes forward with talk of just a little escalation--more bombs, more men and women, more force. History has not been kind to this approach to war-making. In fact this approach has been tragic'

 

[excerpts from Colin Powell, 'US Forces: The Challenges Ahead', Foreign Affairs, Winter, 1992]

'I also want to be clear about what we will not be doing. The US is not going to deploy ground troops into Libya. And we are not going to use force to go beyond a well-defined goal -- specifically, the protection of civilians in Libya.'

US President Barack Obama, March 19

Too many cooks...

British Prime-Minister, Cameron, Feb 28: 'And we do not in any way rule out the use of military assets, we must not tolerate this regime using military force against its own people. In that context I have asked the Ministry of Defence and the Chief of the Defence Staff to work with our allies on plans for a military no-fly zone.'

US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates: warns against 'loose talk' of no-fly zone. 'A no-fly zone begins with an attack on Libya, with an attack on air defences'. And would 'require more aircraft than are on a single aircraft carrier.'

French Government Spokesman, Francois Barouin: the goal of the military action would be to 'protect the Libyan people and to allow them to go all the way in their drive for freedom, which means bringing down the Gaddafi regime'.

UK Defence Secretary Liam Fox: targetting Qaddafi, 'would potentially be a possibility'

US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates: it would be, 'unwise' to try to kill Qaddafi.

General Sir David Richards, Chief of Defence Staff, March 21, morning: Qaddafi 'absolutely not' a target.

March 21, Afternoon, UK [government sources] cited by BBC: More on the question of whether it is legal to target Col Gaddafi: British government sources have said it is legal under the UN resolution to target the Libyan leader. Sources say under the UN resolution 1973, the coalition have the power to target him if he is a threat to the civilian population of Libya. The source said the chief of the defence staff, Gen Sir David Richards, was wrong to say that it was not allowed under the UN resolution. However sources declined to say whether this meant Col Gadaffi was a target.

Amr Moussa, Sec-Gen, Arab League, March 18: 'The goal is to protect civilians first of all, and not to invade or occupy. The resolution is clear on that point' and the League has 'stressed the jamming of radar that would not allow the attacking of the civilian population'.

Amr Moussa, Sec-Gen, Arab League, March 19/20: 'What is happening in Libya differs from the aim of imposing a no-fly zone, and what we want is the protection of civilians and not the bombardment of more civilians.'

Amr Moussa, Sec-Gen, Arab League, March 20/21: “The Arab League decisions have been announced and we are committed to them. We respect the Security Council resolution and have no contradiction with this resolution' 

US President Obama on a coalition in a single speech:

'The US has worked with our allies and partners to shape a strong international response'.

'The US is prepared to act as part of an international coalition. American leadership is essential, but that does not mean acting alone.'

'So I have taken this decision with the confidence that action is necessary, and that we will not be acting alone.'

'It is not an action that we will pursue alone. Indeed, our British and French allies, and members of the Arab League, have already committed to take a leadership role'.

Russian Prime-Minister Vladmir Putin, March 21: condemned the resolution as 'flawed'. 'It allows everything. It resembles medieval calls for crusades.' 

India: The government in New Delhi added to the criticism, saying in a statement: “India views with grave concern the continuing violence, strife and deteriorating humanitarian situation in Libya. It regrets the air strikes that are taking place. The measures adopted should mitigate and not exacerbate an already difficult situation for the people of Libya.” 

China: “regretted” the military action and respected Libya’s sovereignty. A foreign ministry statement said: “China has noted the latest developments in Libya and expresses regret over the military attacks on Libya.

“We hope Libya can restore stability as soon as possible and avoid further civilian casualties due to an escalation of armed conflict,” it added. 

Command and Control?

Gates, March 20: US will not have a 'preeminent role'.

Bulgarian PM, Borisov, March 21: 'I hope that today, NATO will take command because even the Americans insist on a European Command.' NATO hasn’t still taken the command. 'There are many mixed signals and it shows how topsy-turvy world is in making decisions. Many European politicians have very guilty conscience about being, the life and behaviour of Gaddafi years ago.'

Unnamed European Diplomat, March 21: 'France are the only ones opposed to a unified command under NATO. It is completely isolated.' 

Luxembourg Foreign Minister Jean Asselborn: lamented that the, 'game between the coalition and NATO is undermining the whole international community.'

Liam Fox, March 20, interview with BBC: 'Some of our allies have been worried that this is, this might not be the best way to get Arab participation in the coalition'.