Technology (1)

This morning the U.S. published its National Military Strategy (NMS) for 2011 which called for 'full-spectrum' deployment of U.S. power and an imperceptible nod to the rise of soft power in countering foreign aggression, in all its forms. This week also, the first in a new generation of drones, this one the X-47B (Northrop Grumman), had its test flight. 


Drones represent another step level development in the American-led Revolution in Military Affairs, a strategic initiative that was first proposed by Russian military chiefs, until they rapidly ran out of money at the end of the Cold War [for an overview of the development in this thought see Gregory, D. (2010) 'War and peace', Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 35, pp.154-186]. The technology in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles is advanced - you've seen the Chinese trumpet their stealth fighter to the media, but their drones (they do have some) are of a less impressive functionality. The NMS is particularly forceful in its language against China - and with this technological advantage, it is easy to see why Mullen, of the Joint Chiefs, can still beat his drum. For further information on drones see the excellent dronewars blog. The MOD has thus far acquired three Reapers and has funded its own Taranis project with test flights due to start this year. 


Further to my discussion previous on the U.S. government voting on an internet kill switch and how to work hot wars in cyberspace, at the Munich Security Conference this coming Friday, a "Geneva Convention" for the internet is to be discussed. The media will run with all the cyberspace stories from the conference, so expect 'security in the cloud' to be the hot topic in the weeks to come. 

[Stage Centre] Egypt

‘Democracy is like virginity: you can’t have a limited amount of it.’

[Quoted from BBC World Service Bulletin, 06/02/11]

Vali Nasr, an Iranian-American Professor of International Politics at Tufts University has the ear of the White House on all things relating to Iran. Interesting then that his 2009 book ‘Forces of Fortune: The Rise of the New Muslim Middle Class and What It will Mean for Our World’ observes the rise of a new Muslim bourgeoise society that, he argues, will limit the allure of extremism in the Middle East. The battle in the Middle East, Nasr posits, will not be fought along religious battlelines but on grounds of business and commerce – the economy matters. In defence of his argument, Nasr cites Dubai and Turkey as models where, in the case of the latter, religious intolerance in an Islamist state gave way to a ‘Western-style conservatism’.

Nasr must be watching events unfold in Egypt with interest. The most commonly voiced concern of the protestors was that the rich/poor divide had become untenable – their relative poverty denied them the basic ‘privileges’, especially marriage. One source estimated that the protests were costing the country $310 million a day in lost productivity. Given that the GDP for Egypt is estimated at $188 billion that means over 7 days the protests directly lost over 0.5% of the annual GDP for the country. Little wonder then that Mubharak was able to convince elements within the protestors to get back to work.  

The prominence in the media of the Muslim Brotherhood becoming involved in the negotiations with the vice-president is important, but the background and attitudes towards this group are more so. Founded by the influential Hasan al-Banna in 1928 (assassinated, 1948) they are despised by core members of the al-Qaeda group, especially Ayman al-Zawahiri, who believes they sold out the principles of jihad in order to politicize. Since al-Qaeda see all statist regimes as apostate and backed by the West, no negotiation with them is possible. The group has been banned in Egypt since 1954 (under Nasser) since a member tried to assassinate the President, and over 4000 of its members were imprisoned. Most of the members were released in 1964 but a further assassination attempt was met with stern reprisals – many of the top leaders including a key idealogue, Sayyid Qutb (a jihadi ideologue whose death increased the appeal of his writings, especially Milestones) were hanged. Since the Muslim Brotherhood have been outlawed, the core has moved ever closer to the centre ground of Egyptian politics whilst more radical elements within the organisation have split off into other factions and faced severe crackdowns by the Egyptian police. Seventeen members of the Muslim Brotherhood, running as independents since the group is prohibited from running, won seats in the Peoples' Assembly in 2000 in government out of approximately 450 seats and candidates allied to the group accounted for approximately 20% of the 454 seats in 2005.

This goes some way to explaining the Pew Global Attitudes poll released in January 2011  which saw a large preference across Muslim majority countries for democracy. Half of Egyptian Muslims interviewed saw Islam as playing a small role in politics, half saw it as a playing a large part and over 80% saw Islam as having a positive influence on politics. But the more interesting outcome was when asked about if they thought there was a struggle between modernizers and Islamic fundamentalists in the country and if so, which of the two groups one identified with. Only two countries had a majority that identified with the Islamists over the modernizers - Egypt and Nigeria. For Egyptians, Islamism means the Muslim Brotherhood, who, as stated, has played a very conservative, centre-right political role in the country. They thus have a vast amount of leverage in the ongoing discussions and command more broad support, according to Pew, that the Western-backed “modernizing” element of which we assume Mubharak is a tainted figurehead. 

Order from Chaos

Mubharak raises the spectre of Islamism in bid to shore up support

‘The root causes of modern Islamic militancy are the myriad grievances that lead to the first step on the road to terrorism being taken. Social and economic problems are critical. Such problems are growing more, not less widespread and profound throughout the Islamic world. The economies of states from Morocco to Indonesia are in an appalling state. Population growth continues unabated. Unemployment, particularly among critical groups like graduates, is rising fast. Housing is crowded and sanitation is basic in many cities. The gulf between the rich and the poor is increasing.

But these problems alone do not cause terrorism. If individuals have faith in a political system, a belief that they can change their lives through activism that is sanctioned by the state or understand and accept the reasons for their hardships, they are unlikely to turn to militancy. But there is little reason to be optimistic about the possible development of alternatives that might divert the angry and resentful from radical Islam in the near future…One of the reasons for a more radical, debased and violent form of protest is the tendency of governments in the Middle East to crush moderate movements. Because they are scared of radical Islam taking power, the regimes block democratic reform. Because there is no reform, radical Islamic movements, moderate or violent, are crushed or fail, anger is channelled into the symbolic realm.

-- Burke (2003) Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror (London: IBT), pp. 247-248

‘Because the [Middle East] governments are relatively powerless to affect U.S. policy toward them, they turn their energies to repressing and keeping down their own populations, which results in resentment, anger and helpless imprecations that do nothing to open up societies where secular ideas about human history and development have been overtaken by failure and frustration, as well as by Islamism built out of rote learning.’

-- Said (2003) Orientalism (London: Penguin), xxi.

Mubharak’s interview on ABC was a master political stroke, in playing to the fears of the American public and wider world audience of the rise of a powerful Islamist nation, the incumbent has sought to rally Western leaders to his ‘better the devil you know’ banner, albeit temporarily, whilst he can depart on his own terms, rather than as a fugitive in exile and with the state monopoly on violence intact. Thus Mubharak has created uncertainty - are the cities in chaos and prone to Islamist elements coopting the popular demonstrations, or is the 'chaos' (his own word) inflated by the government to warrant emergency measures to 'bring order'. The hypocrisy, in criticising foreign powers, but giving the interview to a Western broadcaster rather than the state Nile T.V. is a gamble that seeks to promote the spectre of Islamism in western media broadcasts. For the protestors, they see themselves in unchartered territory, for in the beginning the ‘Tunisian model’, as a template for the protestors, must now be consigned to history: Mubharak has not proved as accommodating as Ben Ali -  a point reinforced by Omar Suleiman’s subsequent interview with ABC. 

El Baradei has not proved a coalescing or invigorating figure. His low-key tactic is understandable – fervent protest could risk further bloodshed – estimates are generally that 300 people have already died on Egypt’s streets as a result of the violence. So what now? The stalemate and media-driven campaign of Mubharak gives, ‘new fetters to the weak and new forces to the rich’ (J.-J. Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men). Since the protestors have nowhere near the necessary power to attempt to secure the monopoly on violence needed to tilt the balance in their favour, it’s possible that short-term economic necessities may predominate, elements may return to work and impetus, both national and regional will have been lost. Police intimidating world media on the city streets lessen the ability of these outlets to cover/exacerbate the protests.

Mubharak has made some smart calculations: estimates vary wildly, but generally, it’s believed about 300 000 protestors are against him in Cairo – that only represents approximately 1 in 60 people in the city of 18 million people. Compare this to the peaceful anti-war demonstration in London, February 15, 2003 that saw 1 million people (1 in 6 of the population of the city) converge upon the capital. In Rome, on the same day, 3 million people protested (the largest anti-war rally in history). If Mubharak adds the Muslim Brotherhood as a hardcore agitator, then he believes that many elements of the protest may be coerced back to ‘society’ by making certain concessions. Again, Sallust, “few men desire liberty, the rest seek nothing more than fair masters.” Since the ‘protests’ (rather than a ‘revolt’ since there has been no concerted effort to seize power) are confined to major cities, there is no national uprising. Since there is no national uprising, Mubharak can station the army in highly visual locations around the cities and counter the protests with his ‘pro-government’ supporters. The next move is the protestors. Mobilisation through the Internet will now only get the demonstrators to a certain position. Coordinated use of transport to mobilise peripheral areas of the state and strategic denial of critical infrastructure to government forces are perhaps meaningful actions.

There is a lot at stake here as the dynamic shifts and alters daily - Egypt fairs poorly in the latest Human Rights Watch world report most notably for its use of secret police as an ‘instrument of punishment and repression. Thus it is obvious which elements make up the bulk of the pro-Mubharak resistance – any transitional phase, no matter if only a few hours, would surely see massive reprisals against the police as the monopoly on violence was briefly lost and anarchy prevailed.

Finger on the Button

All five network providers now running internal internet traffic in Egypt again – a mixture of motivations seem likely for this. Firstly, the loss of ‘economic infrastructure’ associated with the loss of the Internet would not have pleased investors or big business. Secondly, this denial of service was enacted to prevent mobilisation and coordination through social media, since now famously, the events here started with a single facebook page. Instead, the denial seemed only to further inflame the protests as an obvious further infringement on freedoms. The Internet in the 21^st century is a further shared space in which the world operates, just as we inhabit the shared territories of land, sea and air (For the famous 1968 paper on the ‘original’ commons and finite space see here).

Thus, interestingly, whilst Tunisia was enabled via social media and Egypt was being denied access, in the United States, congress is currently debating elements of a new cybersecurity bill in which there is the option to create an internet ‘kill-switch’, a one-stop action that would shut off the Internet in the United States. Recent focus has shifted to cybersecurity, since it creates a new world in which ‘conflict’ can erupt without the traditional measures of deterrence or fallout. No soldiers point guns in cyberspace. ‘Hot Wars’ can break out in cyberspace but would this lead to military reprisals – how will economic warfare in cyberspace be responded to in the future?

See Further:

Lynn, William (2010) ‘Defending a New Domain: The Pentagon’s Cyberstrategy’, Foreign Affairs, September/October

Remember the Neocons?

The rush to say, ‘I knew I was right’

David Ucko at kingsofwar blogs on recent articles arguing that neoconservatism has been ‘proved right’ by recent events in Tunisia and Egypt (and now Jordan and Yemen) in that the basic struggle for recognition (Fukuyama) feeds an unquenchable thirst for democratic rule. The crux of the new defence of neoconservatism is here:

‘But though the neoconservatives have been down, they are not out. For with popular unrest sweeping the Middle East, from Tunisia to Yemen to Egypt, the neoconservative ideal – that the West must stand firm for the non-negotiable demands of human dignity; that is, the rule of law, limits on the power of the state, respect for women, private property, free speech, equal justice, and religious tolerance – looks more attractive than it has done for years.’

Ucko argues cogently against this observation but the real point is that neoconservatism has become such a loose amalgam of ideas that the doctrine can never be proved false, as it can neither be proven correct. It was Karl Popper who proposed a novel solution to the problem of how to demarcate science and non-science. According to his principle of falsificationism, a theory was scientific if it could be proved false – in that way the theory was rigorous enough to potentially be falsified by new data set. In non-science, Popper argued, the theories - and here Freud’s work was noted – were so vague and so subject to interpretation that they could never be proved false – merely they would become reinvented should data occur to potentially falsify the theory. Falsificationism was used by Judge William Overton in determining that ‘creation science’ was unscientific and should not be taught in schools in the state of Arkansas.

There are elements in neoconservatism to extract and utilise in the current analysis of events in the Maghreb and Middle East – Fukuyama certainly has relevance. But can anyone concisely define what neoconservatism has become? Is it Tony Blair’s speech delivered at the Economic Club, Chicago, April 24, 1999? Is it about coercing the democratic wave, provided the leaders elected thereafter sit well with U.S. national interest? Is it instead about censorship and the banning of pornography, as advocated by Irving Kristol, to save society? We had better get used to the presence of neoconservative doctrine, and a lot of people saying that what is happening now in the Maghreb and Middle East has proved them right.    

See further:

Stelzer, Irwin ed. (2004) Neoconservatism (London: Atlantic)

Gordon, Philip H. (2003) ‘Bush’s Middle East Vision’, Survival, 45(1), pp.155-165

Project for a New American Century 

Kagan, R. and Kristol, W. eds. (2000) Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy (San Francisco: Encounter)