'Each man takes the limits of his own field of vision for the limits of the world'
-- Arthur Schopenhauer, Essays and Aphorisms

'Artists are tricky fellows sir, forever shaping the world according to some design of their own'
-- Jonathan Strange, Jonathan Strange & Mr Norrell

Monday 30 May 2011

Bin Laden's a lot more funny now he's dead

The Daily Mail republished an article on lego depictions of key media images from bin Laden's death under the headline, Bricking It

Recreation of the still shot from the White House Situation Room 
as the Seal team raid unfolded in real time. 
Not sure they got Obama quite right. The Hillary Clinton resemblance
is uncanny, though.
Compare the tone of the article, light-hearted and amused, with the outrage from anti-extremist groups in 2008 when the company BrickArms produced a figure called "Mr White -bandit" that some said resembled an Islamic terrorist or even, Osama bin Laden.

Not sure the folks who interpreted this figurine as Osama
got it quite right, but he does look like one of the 
perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks. 
Quite why he seems to be holding a Mauser c96 is something 
of a mystery, too. Perhaps attempting to equate jihadism 
with the Third Reich. Bin Laden claimed he got his 
AK47 from a Russian soldier he killed in battle. Perhaps the 
lego figurine had despatched a German WWII soldier 
on the Eastern Front. It's lego, after all.

Bin Laden becomes much more iconic in the Western consciousness after his death. He becomes subsumed into popular culture and we accomodate him into our collective psyche. Consider, too, Osama bin Laden t-shirts: exactly the same scenario plays out. During his life, a t-shirt sporting his image enraged Nike since it incorporated the Swoosh logo. This was even before 9.11. Since his death, American manufacturers have cashed in on his demise, one seller boasting of having made 120, 000 dollars in two days.

Naomi Klein will testify - the West has an ability to market and capitalise on images and themes and then consume it in quantities that generate massive profits for the companies involved. Osama bin Laden was probably the financial backer that enabled 9.11. At KingsofWar they already observed that he could become an iconic image like the picture of Che that adorns t-shirts. He could become like Hitler, an object of fascination, and a historical relic about which hundreds of books are written. What the West does with him now will be fascinating. 

Review - "Operational Culture for the Warfighter", 2008

To drink tea with the enemy or kill them? Nobody is sure anymore.

Salmoni, B.A. and Holmes-Eber, P. (2008) Operational Culture for the Warfighter: Principles and Applications (Quantico, Virginia: Marine Corps University Press)

The difficulty of prosecuting post-conflict operations in Afghanistan and more prominently at that time, Iraq, led the United States Military to publish Field Manual 3-24 in 2006. The manual contained anthropological wisdom generated from the Cultural Awareness and the Military project (formed at the Watson Institute in 2004), and TRADOC, Ft Leavenworth, Kansas. This manual was written to fill a 'gap' in counterinsurgency theory [the manual superceded FMI 3.07-22 (2004) and MCWP 3-33.5 (1980)], and to update previous thinking.

Taliban in the winter. According to "Operational Culture for the Warfighter", insurgents in Afghanistan exhibit a "local cultural disinclination" to fight in the winter months. Or it could just be that the landscape is ill-suited to guerilla warfare, much as al-Zawahiri lamented the monotonous, arid landscape of the Egyptian countryside. 

'You cannot fight former Saddamists and Islamists' goes the manual, 'the same way you would have fought the Viet Cong, Moros or Tupamoros'. 2006 was, with hindsight, a pivotol year in the US-led occupation of Iraq since the al-Qaeda affiliated Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (though I debate how strong that link ever was, even given the infamous 'correspondence' between he and al-Zawahiri) was deeping antipathy between Sunni and Shia amidst spiralling violence.

Looking back, we definine also during this period the so-called Sunni Awakening, in which the tribal leaders, plausibly with US funding, coagulated to resist the influx of foreign fighters that were conducting jihad against both civilian and military forces in the country without any apparent strategic goal apart from the aim of maximimising casualties, possibly to increase media attention. Even after Zarqawi's death in June of that year, violence in Iraq had reached unprecedented levels. The spectre of Vietnam was raised, of a quagmire and a never-ending stabilisation project. The convergence of a body of anthropological views on prosecuting Phase IV operations and the volatile, precarious situation in Iraq led to the the Petraeus troop-surge in the country in 2007.

The cultural turn had become an ascendent "thought model" within influential circles of the US DOD; believed to be the answer to the inability of US led forces to win the peace in the aftermath of major combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a consequence, and in parallel with the Iraqi troop surge, the DOD outlayed $41 million for the development of the Cultural Operations Research - Human Terrain System (HTS) led by Montgomery McFate, Andrea Jackson (deleted wiki page here role in Lincoln Group here) and Steve Fondacaro, which sought to give anthropologists a combat role, actively implementing, from the front line, cultural expertise, embedded in military units. The use of academics in kinetic operations divided the community. The Network of Concerned Anthropologists formed in reaction and protest at academics prosecuting wars, believing it be ethically indefensible and effectively "weaponizing" anthropology.

In late 2007, the American Anthropological Association issued a statement on HTS, concerned about its ethical implications. The executive board statement concluded that it would 'place anthropologists in positions in which their work will be in violation of the AAA code of ethics'.. In early 2008 one of the anthropologists embedded in US operations in Afghanistan, Michael Bhathia, was killed by an IED, prompting greater media scrutiny of the HTS. Later that same year, another academic embed, Paula Lloyd was doused in flammable liquid and set alight in Afghanistan. She died two months later. The number of serving anthropologists in these Human Terrain Teams never reached numbers of much more than ten - either in Iraq or Afghanistan, In 2010, McFate and Fondacaro both left the programme. 

The fate of HTS and its relegation to the more theoretical and now less fashionable schools of  thought within the US military has created a vast uncertainty over the role of culture in understanding and prosecuting wars. Only recently, John Nagl in a department of War Studies podcast, suggested that there had become too much emphasis on drinking tea with the enemy - that kinetic means were still the most potent in coercing the enemy and winning over local populations by demonstrations of military strength. 

Thus the 2008 manual, Operational Culture for the Warfighter, published by the Marine Corp University, is important in that it reinforces the notion that culture is assumed to play a large role in combat, but what that role is can be very hard to ascertain. Highlighting the fashionable notion that fourth generation warfare, and particularly COIN will be the way in which the Marines deploy in the future, the manual suggests that, 'our wars will be "wars amongst' the people" - not wars against the people and not wars oblivious to the people.'

The "key terrain" argues General Mattis in the foreword, is the will of the host nation's population and that gaining the trust of skeptical populations will suffocate the ideology of the enemy. In battling for the hearts and minds of the local population then, it is assumed that the better you know these people, the more easily you can win them over. The manual reads like a local phrasebook, but instead of learning languages, you can read the signs of the human terrain, instead. Diverse case studies are given which reinforce cultural viewpoints. In seeking to move beyond HTS, the authors stress that culture is mutable and fluid. And yet they still view culture as 'a logical system which can be understood using theories and principles developed during more than 150 years of research and study by social scientists'. It is supposed here that the length of time of study automatically means a greater level of understanding, and this is dangerous. 

Published in the year that two anthropologists were mortally wounded in Afghanistan, the work seeks to move away from basic, simplified expressions of culture and inherent stereotypes but I feel that it never achieves this convincingly. Noting the Culture and Personality studies of WWII, that suggested some cultural reasons for national psychologies (p.18-19), the manual rejects a one-size-fits-all approach to the human terrain. Culture is messy or "fuzzy set" to quote the manual, and the marine should not fall into the trap of homogenizing the human terrain within his Area of Operations.
Emphasizing this risk, the manual defines Human Terrain as 'those cultural aspects of the battlespace that, due to their static nature, can be visually represented on a geographic map. Human terrain is static with respect to change over time; rigid with respect to fluid human relationships and limited to representing human behaviour in only two dimensions' (p.34). Citing a map of Algeria as a caveat, with its areas of Berber and Arabs delineated, the manual warns against such a simplification, suggesting that this is only a macroscopic interpretation and that intermarriage amongst other developments may have enforced tribal links and cross-cultural ties in the region. 

As the manual goes on to present myriad ways in which culture informs decisions within a marine's AO, it falls into two traps. Firstly, the manual overplays the way in which culture informs a population's response to a US marine's presence. Consider this section from the manual:

"U.S. personnel in Afghanistan frequently notice a drop in insurgent activity during the winter. Over time, they have come to understand that this is related less to diminished insurgent enthusiasm for anti-Afghan violence, and much more to the local cultural disinclination to fight during the winter months in high altitude. Conversely, the upsurge in violence over the summer and autumn is seasonally driven, and not necessarily a function of greater insurgent zeal."

A "Local cultural disinclination" is given as the reason for dropping activity in the winter. In fact, operational elements of insurgency are much more easily prosecuted in the spring and summer, not because the lazy native finds the winter far too cold to go out and prime IEDs, but instead because the eight foot high crops that grow in the spring and summer enable concealment. One must not give cultural considerations too much sway when life and death are on the line. As Porter has shown elegantly, cultural considerations tend to be swept beneath the carpet and material considerations predominate when the former can negatively influence the latter. This year, insurgent activity in the winter (2010/11) reached unpredented levels as rebels sought to destabilise the region and influence phased troop withdrawals - creating casualties and negatively impacting on domestic populations of NATO countries. This wasn't a cultural decision - it was strategic, material. 

Secondly, the manual at times still demarcates a very 'us' and 'them' approach to culture, which is to the detriment of the entire work. As much as it seeks to break away from the "culture and identity" mantra of the WWII anthropologists, it never really does so. Consider in the chapter on belief systems, the following passage (p.173):

In the U.S. for example, the Puritan notion that we can control our lives and experiences through hard work is repeatedly emphasized through such common sayings as:
“Early to bed, early to rise, makes a man healthy, wealthy and wise.”
“God helps those who help themselves.”
These sayings contrast significantly with popular expressions in the Middle East, which emphasize submission to God’s will and acceptance of a divine plan that one cannot control:
Insha’allah
“If God wills it.” (Arabic, Turkish, Persian)
Im yir-tzei HaShem
“If God wills it.” (Hebrew)
Agar reza-ye Khuda bashet
“If it finds the favor of God.” (Persian)
Keh deh khoday reza wi
“God-willing.” (Pashto)
Allah A‘lam
“God knows [the outcome—not I].” (Arabic)
Allah ma‘a al-sabirin
“God is with the patient.” (Arabic)
Significant for Marines, particularly those working in Information Operations, is the way that popular folktales, sayings, and imagined histories are used in propaganda to rouse popular sentiment.

Reading between the lines, the American is the do-it-yourself, can-do motivated warrior in charge of his/her own destiny. The Arab submits (a literal interpretation of 'Islam') to the will of God allowing fate to influence their activities and shape their trajectory. The Iranian too submits (Persian) as does the Jew (Hebrew). Only the Puritan is strong and single-minded. Such a reading elides many expressions in both languages and allows culture to inform activity to a much greater extent that is the reality. The Crusaders shouted Deus Vult (God Wills It) when charging into battle during the First Crusade - such a cry invoked their God as the true God and helped to define their own troops (Christian, righteous) against the enemy (Muslim, infidel). Americans are as likely to say "God only knows" as much as any Arab, but beyond that, religion invocations carry with them much greater weight than the simplicity of the expression itself.
Ann Marlowe was right in 2006 when she wrote that 'there are some things the Army needs  in Afghanistan, but more academics are not at the top of the list'. She is still right now. Ultimately, phase IV operations aren't about culture - they are about the ability of the soldier to move away from his perception of the space as an area to be conquered, to a view of the terrain as a place to be reconstructed. The same people, that the soldier has recently homogenized and degraded in his own mind, termed them the enemy, in order to rationalise a use of violence, must then be reconfigured in his psyche as a "host population" meriting the soldier's assistance and understanding. This is the big problem with COIN - how to deconstruct a rationale of violence to one of assistance, whilst still enmeshed within a language of war that dehumanizes and homogenizes the local population.   

Consider Iraq. For the soldiers, the country consisted of two colour-coded zones. The green zone was the safe area ensconced behind high walls in the centre of Baghdad. The other area was called the red zone. All of the local population, regardless of gender or age were termed hajis, a derogatory name, given because muslims must at one point in their lives go on the pilgrimmage to Mecca. One zone for the population - red, for danger - and one name for them. That's a great mindset for prosecuting a war; it's a terrible mindset for stabilising a peace. 

The kinetic operations in Afghanistan undertaken by NATO are being cloaked in a humanitarian discourse that disguises the military aspect of developing 'security on the ground'. The media war is seeking provide covering fire whilst the kinetic war is prosecuted. McChrystal may have attempted to develop relations between the foreign agents and the Afghans (he had good relations with Karzai, which was unusual for a high ranking U.S. official, civilian or military) but his successor Petraeus has escalated operations that seek to limit the exposure of NATO troops to danger. Airstrikes in Afghanistan and drone strikes in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas have increased. Yesterday, after yet another airstrike that killed civilians, Karzai warned NATO against the continued use of these tactics.


Paula Holmes-Eber teaches the operational culture to marines at Quantico. She weds anthropology specifically to military effectiveness. This 2008 manual influenced the 2010 book she co-edited with Donald Gardner, Applications in Operational Culture: Perspectives from the Field. She can be contacted regarding her work at pholmeseber@gmail.com

Barak Salmoni moved from the Marine Corp Center for Advanced Operational Cultural Learning to RAND in 2008.

More:
See especially this informed FabiusMaximus piece that works as a bibliography.
 
Pilon, J. G. ed. (2009) Cultural Intelligence for Winning the Peace (Washington, D.C: The Institute of World Politics Press)

Porter, P. (2009) Military Orientalism (London: Hurst)

Shaffer ed. (2006) The Limits of Culture: Islam and Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press)

Stanton, J. (2009) General Petraeus' Favorite Mushroom: Inside the US Army's Human Terrain System

Thursday 19 May 2011

Standpoint.

A 2000-word article I wrote on Afghanistan has been kindly published by Standpoint. Online here. Whilst on the subject of Afghanistan, a friend took a number of photos from his last tour and has also kindly allowed me to reproduce two below. 

The first shows the operational difficulty of counter-insurgency in the green zone (fertile area on banks of Helmand river) during the Spring/Summer because of the added concealment afforded by the flora. 

The second is just a photo that appealed to me but perhaps also shows why anthropologists were mobilised into the counter-insurgency efforts as Human Terrain Teams (see also the Network of Concerned Anthropologists and also Human Terrain movie); visually it seems to show the difficulty of negating cultural differences and language barriers when prosecuting "post-conflict reconstruction".

Culture has become an overarching concern for COINistas. Consider the first photo and then this extract from Operational Culture for the Warfighter (2008):

"U.S. personnel in Afghanistan frequently notice a drop in insurgent activity during the winter. Over time, they have come to understand that this is related less to diminished insurgent enthusiasm for anti-Afghan violence, and much more to the local cultural disinclination to fight during the winter months in high altitude. Conversely, the upsurge in violence over the summer and autumn is seasonally driven, and not necessarily a function of greater insurgent zeal."

In fact, tactical considerations are mistaken here for "local cultural disinclination", which seems to hark back to ideas of the "lazy natives". Material interests are mistaken for cultural practices. The flora in the summer makes insurgent activity easier than in the barren winter months. We need culture in our calculations, but must not let it drive every aspect of our considerations. Culture is fluid and easily manipulated - stereotypes are a poor weapon in war. Material considerations - survival - trump cultural norms.

Copyright: Adam Collington

Copyright: Adam Collington

Monday 16 May 2011

Iran and the Skype of Civilizations

A stone thrown at the right time is better than gold given at the wrong time
-- Iranian Proverb

The Iranian revolution is not exclusively that of Iran, because Islam does not belong to any particular people
-- Ayatollah Khomeini

On the surface, the state of Iran since the 1399AH revolution serves only as an instrument of the belief system. It is however the material interests of the regime which dominates its foreign policy choices, though often they can be cloaked and couched within cultural terms.

Since Iran has identified itself with a world ummah, this would suggest that the main foreign policy goal would be to promote Shi’a elements within neighbouring states and further afield. In fact, the geostrategic aims of state preservation and projection dominate. The collapse of the Soviet Union brought with it the independence of six muslim-dominated states bordering or close to Iran’s Eastern and Northern borders. In a demonstration of the fluid nature of culture, Iran has voiced Persian, Iranian and even Turkic concerns in order to appeal to identities, in support of state interests.

Chechen Muslims’ battle for independence from Moscow has not damaged excellent relations enjoyed between Russia and Iran, and when the situation became particularly acute, Iranian military personnel were dispatched to Moscow to assist in formulating strategy against the Chechens.

The Nagorno-Karabagh conflict that broke out in 1408AH between predominantly Christian Armenia and predominantly Shi’a Azerbaijan saw Iran support Armenia. Tehran adopted anti-Armenian rhetoric only during periods when escalation (1413AH) in the conflict directly threatened Iranian interests. To keep Azerbaijan focused elsewhere relieved pressure from its border.

In Tajikistan’s civil war (began 1407AH), Iran initially supported the Islamic Renaissance Party but switched support to a peace process and integration, in line with Moscow.

Many analysts have seen the initial interference by the Islamic Republic of Iran in other states as a signal of its intent to export Islamic revolution to the region. It supported agitation in Shi’ite towns in Saudi province of Hasa (late 1399AH and early 1400AH), also in Bahrain, and funded a terrorist campaign in Kuwait. In neighbouring Iraq, Iran sought to topple the Ba’th regime under the new ruler, Saddam Hussein and supported the Kurdish revolt in the North. So concerned was Iraq about the growing Iranian influence, that Saddam, backed by the United States, launched an attack on Iran (the war became known in Iran as the ‘imposed war’ and ‘holy defence’, in order to suggest a defence of Islam) starting a war that was to last 8 years, the longest conventional war of the century, which included strategic bombing, and cost 500 000 to 1 million Iranian lives and 300 000 Iraqi lives.

After Saddam, the Shi’a population in Southern Iraq seem less interested in Iran than with their own country. A universal ummah, voiced by leaders of the Iranian revolution has failed to become a popular regional narrative. The majority of the muslim world is Sunni. So what is Iran really doing geopolitically, behind the rhetoric and with what consequence for Arabia in its rebellions?

Iran uses Islam instrumentally to pursue state interests both at home and abroad. The ruling regime espouses a hard-line Islamic creed in order to subject its population to a tyranny created by controlling the monopoly on violence, as witnessed by the suppression of the uprising in 1430AH. It enjoys best relations with Christian populated Armenia and secular Turkmenistan. Enemies are determined by material interests and strategy rather than an apocalyptical vision of religious battle but the rhetoric, the justification, is religious. The United States serves as the Great Satan, being blamed for Armenia expelling hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijani refugees, Russia attacking Azerbaijan and attacking Chechnya.

Recently, the regime in Bahrain has attempted to paint the protests there as inspired and supported by Iran. The protestors are mainly Shi’a and the regime is Sunni, as is the Gulf Bloc that condemned Iranian interference yesterday. The bloc also condemned an alleged Iranian spy network in Kuwait. But wikileaks disclosures have noted an absence of Iranian intervention in the country amid continued unrest between the Shi’a population and the Sunni regime. Bahrain is wary of the threat according to a US diplomat, ‘While keeping close to their American protectors, Bahrain's rulers seek to avoid provoking Iran unnecessarily, and keep channels of communication with Iranian leaders open.’ American diplomats meanwhile see no evidence of Iranian weapons or funding in the country for over two decades.

Culture

It is plausible to view Iran as as ‘Iranic’ civilization, at once part of, but distinct from, the broader Islamic civilization. Many elements of the population, which is a cultural composite, reject notions of Persian identity, or indeed a state-centred Iranian identity. Iran’s bipolar disorder, as at once a self-proclaimed vessel for a trans-state interest (the ummah) but also the state itself, leaves it open to multiple cases of contradicting policy and rhetoric. Policy choices can be made that contradict official rhetoric without damaging the credibility of the regime, suggesting that cultural norms can be remade under pressure without serious consequence. In fact, the name Islamic Republic of Iran suggests conflicting identities – as part of a world Islamic faith, as being a republic respondent to the needs and desires of the populace, and of being the state of Iran, a geographically shackled entity with commensurate state interests. The Iran-Contra affair of 1406AH, in which Iran was supplied arms from America, via Israel, is a case where material interests dominated the anti-Western rhetoric.

President Ahmadinejad, for all the immensely negative portrayals of him in the West is a shrewd politician. Even as a hard-liner, he was propelled to victory on the back of an election that painted him as a man of the people. He has ostensibly sought to engage the youth, pushing for allowing women to enter football stadiums and to lower the voting age from 18 to 15. He is also astute in the field of foreign policy, arguing against human rights abuses in other countries. His controversial speech at Columbia University in 1428AH, preceded by Lee Bollinger’s emotive outburst, was an unqualified propaganda triumph.

The discrepancy is that hard-line rhetoric which expresses the most anti-American sentiment of any ruling regime covers a remarkably young and pro-American population. America contains a significant Iranian diaspora and a remarkable grass-roots activist community (for example, lissnup.com). As such, there exists an internet-enabled dynamic between the population in Iran and in the United States that flies in the face of the axis of evil versus the great satan. The positive future for America must, ironically, be seen in Iran above all other countries in the region. Close ties are already being forged between Iranian academics, journalists, students and activists and there American counterparts. Intrigue might not change Iran, demographics and time will do so, inevitably. 

Given the military might of the Iranian regime, international condemnation over its actions, particularly domestic repression is muted at the highest political levels. The young demographic, itself a product of the revolution, when the rulers closed family planning clinics and praised large families, will ultimately enact the change against the regime. 66% of the population are under 30, 40% are under 18. The social prospects for this generation will be poor, as the economy will not be able to provide enough socially mobile jobs. There are places for only 400 000 of the 1.5 million university applicants. Lack of material prosperity and lack of recognition will be the two great drivers of change in the coming years. The internet demonstrates the world that Iran can have, but does not yet have physical access to.

The regime understands the problem. It has purged the universities of its opponents (for instance the case of Hashem Aghajari) and created policies that favour students with pro-regime leanings. The primary student group is the Office for the Consolidation of Unity, a regime-backed entity that promoted Islamic ideology evolved rapidly to become autonomous. A spin-off group, the Union of Islamic Associations was formed with similar radical activist composition. Since media outlets and journalists have been subjected to harsh penalties, censure and the latter with imprisonment, the Internet is the ideal medium through which the youth and anti-regime voices can regroup and articulate themselves. Some sources suggest that there are 80 000 female bloggers in Iran. Up to 150 000 to 200 000 people leave Iran each year through legal or illegal means, contributing to the immense ‘brain drain’ in the country.

Whilst the Qu’ran is a document which appeals to the poor, Iran is a country where 10% of the population controls 76% of the resources. 12% of the population live in absolute poverty. Iran is a wealthy country, with $70 billion in oil revenues in 2008 so its poverty is a direct result of political negligence. Radical egalitarian theories espoused by Mahmud Talequani and Mohammad Baqer Sadr have grown in popularity, as they expound a redistribution of wealth. Job creation would need to stand at 800 000 yearly in order to quell discontent. The demographics do not add up and a point will be reached where the prospect of continued poverty and unemployment will be outweighed by the potential gains of a mass uprising.



Tuesday 10 May 2011

Caveman

'And now, I said, let me show in a figure how far our nature is enlightened or unenlightened: Behold! human beings living in a underground cave'
--Socrates in Plato's The Republic, Book VII

My final thoughts on the cave/luxury compound. Daniel Byman writes in Foreign Affairs this month ('Terrorism After the Revolutions', published before the bin Laden killing) that, 'indeed, looking out from bin Laden's cave, the Arab world looks less promising [for Jihadists] than it did only a few months ago.'

A Pakistani woman photographed her daughter at the gate of the compound where Osama bin Laden was killed in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Copyright: Aqeel Ahmed/AP, reproduced by NYT here.
This made me realise that whilst both the West and the Jihadists propagate the idea of bin Laden in the cave, they do so for opposed reasons. The West puts bin Laden in a cave because it visualises him as a cave-dweller and his jihad as a throw back to an era before history, before civilization. He's hiding from the forces of enlightenment and order in the dwelling of neanderthals. The cave serves to illustrate the lack of progress that can be made by the jihadists, their inability to produce social contracts, institutions of government, technology, infrastructure. Indeed, much of the work at CTC, West Point has focused on the absence of any jihadist blueprint for government (see inter alia, Lahoud, N. (2010) The Jihadis' path to self-destruction). Having moved away from the Muslim Brotherhood's ideals of politicised Islam, which made concessions in order to produce a palattable idea of government, the jihadists rejected all forms of the political, preferring only the relationship between the individual and God - thus the West demonstrates this apparent rejection of civilisation by production of an atavistic image and accompanying narrative. 

The jihadist propagation of bin Laden in a cave is meant to enhance the bin Laden brand - the myth of the man as a symbol. In this way he becomes more than a figurehead, he seeks the amplitude of the idea of his self into something broader and less tangible. He is the austere leader who has rejected Western luxuries in pursuit of jihad. He has travelled to the peripheries of the Islamic world to fight to expand the dar-al-islam, at the boundaries of the dar-al-harb. The cave is where the warrior in the mountain lives. Compare this with Rashid ad-Din Sinan, known to history as 'the old man of the mountain', the leader of the infamous hashashain sect (of the heretical Nizari Shi'a) in Syria in the 12th century and considered in some contemporary writings as semi-divine. Bin Laden, is (or, was) attempting to portray himself as the living embodiment of the untainted 'Salafist jihadist' (the term is Kepel's) ideal. 

Strange then, that he ends up in the million dollar compound...

Tuesday 3 May 2011

The Cave/Luxury Compound Dichotomy

I wonder if it's of any consequence, but when I think of bin Laden, it's in a cave or in a mountainous region. 

Bin Laden in Af-Pak border. Beside him the presence of an AK-47/AKM indicates the violent nature of Jihad and his credentials as a soldier of God.


Bin Laden's appeal stemmed in part from his rejection of the luxurious Saudi lifestyle which his family, as a construction empire embedded with the House of Saud, had come to know. Many who had met him during the later part of the Afghan civil war spoke of his humility and his austere living. How many times have we been told that he is in a cave complex? First in Spin Boldak during the end of 2001 and later in the FATA that sit between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Singaporean diplomat who asked, 'how can one man in a cave outcommunicate the world's greatest communication society?' was not alone in assuming that bin Laden had gone to ground. 

The Qu'ran is a leftist document, it appeals to the disenfrancised. It distinguishes between justice and injustice. It empowers the poor and resents the rich. Bin Laden was a living embodiment of this literature. He had rejected luxury for his faith. This was part of the myth. So what does it mean that when killed, he was living in a $1million dollar gated villa in a beautiful town in Pakistan? Does it mean that his fighting had merited his luxurious retirement or do his followers, adherents, admirers and sympathisers expect the great sacrifice of the man to endure to his end? The smouldering gated compound is an odd final image for the man who became thought of as the old man of the mountain. He had the comfort of and support of many members of his family who were with him in the complex.

The general history of his habitation is delineated by Jason Burke today in a Guardian piece:
"In the late 1990s, for propaganda purposes, Bin Laden invited select journalists to meet him in caves near Tora Bora in eastern Afghanistan. However he lived in a much more comfortable compound a short drive away, near the former Soviet collective farm of Hadda owned by a local warlord. By 1999 he had moved to a complex of houses near Kandahar. When he was killed, he was living in a relatively comfortable detached house in Abbottabad, Pakistan. In between, there is no evidence that he spent any time living in caves. The rest of al-Qaida's senior militants appear to have lived in the semi-fortified houses that are common in the tribal zones."

Both the Western and al-Qaeda narratives propagated the 'idea of the cave'. November 29, 2001, the London Times apparently carried an amazing (in hindsight) image (I haven't verified this graphic but see also SKY) of what the US-led forces would encounter in Spin Boldak, in keeping with this James Bond evil villain intent on world domination theme that had developed in the aftermath of 9.11 in the media:
The New York Times and no less a polarizing figure than Donald Rumsfeld both asserted that these cave complexes existed, the latter suggesting there were many of them. Jason Burke (2003, I.B.Taurus/London, p.73) argued as much, drawing on evidence from interviewees (showing the difficulty of differentiating fact and fiction in these accounts).

The Cave Caveat

The residence of a public figure has been important in some recent Islamic narratives. When Ahmadinejad was running for President of Iran, it was widely held that his decision to let media film his austere, basic living quarters generated a spike in approval. Ahmadinejad also achieved notoriety by driving around in a three-decade old Peugeot 504. Jihadists often commentate on the disconnect between the wealthy American politicians and the fighters that prosecute their wars. 

Finally, it's not a powerful, resonant final act that bin Laden constructed. Rather he was a passive unwilling participant in it. No opposite forces were harmed. There was no great stand-off or siege but instead he went quietly into the night. No enduring images or myth to be embraced by jihadists across the globe. He now becomes consigned to his writings and pronouncements and thought of in that luxury villa, sixty miles from Islamabad.

Monday 2 May 2011

Osama Bin Laden's Death - Ten Things That Happen Now

1. Obama is re-elected in a landslide
Strange how bin Laden's last impact was to influence a Western election. Just as jihadist acolytes had driven the encumbent Iraq-invasion supporting government in Spain from office when they bombed the Madrid trains, and just as bin Laden's video may have left Kerry stranded in the polls and precipitated Bush returning to office, in being killed during Obama's first term, his death will return the president to a second term. Clinton said it's, 'about the economy, stupid', but when you've killed the West's most wanted man after a ten-year hunt, well, that helps your popularity, too.
The chap in the spectacles [bottom right] isn't convinced by it all. "They promised me strippers at this party," he's thinking.

2. Al-Qaeda axis shifts
Many jihadii experts can name at least three centres of AQ activity - al-Qaeda Central (operating out of the autonomous regions of Pakistan); AQ in the Islamic Maghreb (operating principally from Algeria but with transnational reach in the Sahel); AQ in the Arabian Peninsula (operating ostensibly from Yemen, protected by the powerful Awlaki tribe in the region).
Bin Laden has been a marginal figure at best in recent years. The absence of an al-Qaeda spectacular in a decade has led to dwindling funds from sympathetic Saudi figures and other wealthy Gulf admirers. Since his position as the 'world's most wanted man' (I thought that was Prince Harry now, judging by the outpouring of love at the Royal Wedding), he has been dropped from the command structure, operating merely as a symbolic figurehead of spiritual and motivational significance. Even his audio releases merit less air time on Jazeera.

3. Drone use accelerated
Drones have been operating with impunity in the Pakistan borders and will almost certainly been used in this operation in a reconnaisance capacity. To limit their game-changing effects, the al-Qaeda axis will have to shift to new areas, in fact, the drone element may produce an extremely fluid geographical command structure, to the detriment of the group. Leon Panetta has been a big fan of drones. Arguably, drone use is what has allowed bin Laden to be killed now.

4. Mainstream America labours under false assumptions
The cheering crowds of hundreds in front of the White House chanting, "USA, USA" show the palpable relief on the face of a nation. Undoubtedly, the national psyche, so used to "getting things done" and overcoming obstacles by sheer tenacity and willpower, was emasculated by its inability to find "one man in a cave" and who had escaped in Spin Boldak on the Af-Pak border after British special forces may have been asked to stand aside so that US special forces, who then waited for substantial air support, could capture the prize during Operation Anaconda. But bin Laden is really unrelated to the changes that have affected al-Qaeda and the greater jihadist movement.

Dangerously, the world now comes to write Osama bin Laden's obituary. Throughout his later life he was able to harness history to his cause. Through 9.11, an act that he may have funded, the United States prosecuted two exhausting wars, firstly in Afghanistan, that is still ongoing, and in Iraq, which have redirected the emphasis in its military from a peerless symmetric fighting force to the role of counter-insurgency specialism.

Bin Laden's ideology was found wanting, in that jihadism failed to articulate any state-centric blueprint for rule. Jihadists have never toppled government because their means and aims are one and the same - jihadist terrorism that seeks no concessions. The making of a global ummah is as unrealistic and unattainable a goal now as it was a decade ago. It seeks to homogenize under a single banner a religion that is fractured. It ignores politics or working nation-states and devises an as yet unarticulated relationship between the individual and God. For all his peerless spiritual and moral leadership to the jihadis, the group and its affiliates must seek a new direction...


 
5. Jihadist in-fighting momentarily ceases
They will be debating what comes next at Langley and Vauxhall Cross. Either jihadist leaders seek to move themselves centre-stage in the wake of the figurehead's demise, or they coagulate, support and unify. Initially, and with the drone spectre still hanging over them, it seems unlikely that any figure will want to assume leadership. The groups will produce a new wave of invective against the West and stress the aims of their movements, which, as noted, has become an untenable, "jihad for jihad's sake".
 
6. Ayman al-Zawahiri assumes de facto leadership
He may not want the position, but Zawahiri is now the figurehead of al-Qaeda. The real leaders will make themselves known by their words, actions and ability to garner funding in the difficult times ahead. For leading sympathisers that fund the group, al-Qaeda Central is becoming something of an irrelevence. Other groups offer more creativity and tenacity in the north-west frontier province. Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Laskar-e-Taiba (LeT) with training facilities in Kunar province, though only regionally-focused, are large and well-funded groups with high operational capacity in the region. 

7. Al-Awlaki becomes main focus
Operating from Yemen, al-Awlaki now certainly represents the new threat from al-Qaeda. It is not the once in a decade spectaculars that he will propagate, instead he will continue to flatten the jihad structure and as a consequence inspire many more operations but of a less serious magnitude. Whilst he will still focus on trying to achieve hits on soft Western targets, most terrorism will now assume a regional-focus whilst the CIA has the momentum. Gulf patrons of al-Qaeda will be more favourable to coalescing around al-Awlaki than the former Egyptian-based al-Zawahiri - the latter will struggle to hold onto to these important financial bases which may result in him being increasingly isolated. Zawahiri understands the failings of AQ in recent years - his commentary on the 'Arab Spring' as recently as last month has still failed to hijack the uprisings. Jihadism is failing as an idea, many will now look to al-Awlaki to offer some reorientation.

8. Pakistan and U.S. relations worsen
When Pakistan was formed from the Indian-Muslim population in the postcolonial-melting pot after the Second World War, it sought to ally itself with the US to balance power from its regional rival India. Ever since, the US and Pakistan have enjoyed some sort of relationship. Indeed, when the US sought to support radical mujahideen elements in their war against the Soviet puppet in Afghanistan, the CIA channelled its funds through the ISI. Relations must now be at a low ebb. Bin Laden was living in a walled villa in a town sixty miles from the Pakistani capital, Islamabad. Early reports indicate that he had been living there for at least eight months.
It must be assumed that at no point were the Pakistani authorities allowed to know of CIA intelligence nor party to the special forces hit. This suggests that ISI/CIA cooperation will now move to a much lower level. Drone strikes will escalate in the autonomous regions and may even move to Pakistan proper. The CIA will argue that high level operatives are obviously being hidden in Pakistan with the knowledge of elements within the ISI, so the operations should likewise move to within the country. The CIA gets a huge boost from this operational success. Zawahiri and al-Awlaki next in line for the CIA AQ-hunters. Mi6 role in the intelligence aspect of the operation will be interesting, considering their largest base abroad is in Islamabad, 60 miles from where the world's most wanted man was living. Surely this demonstrates the continued difficulty of operating in culturally distinct regions.

9. US nationalism met with increased anti-Westernism
Well Gaddafi, if al-Qaeda were in charge of the uprising against you then the US have done you a great favour. Images of US celebrations beamed worldwide and nationalist chanting do little to offset anti-Westernism, though Obama's muted, defiant statement in the White House was very media savvy affording the al-Qaeda propagandists absolutely nothing to work with. Similarly, OBL's burial at sea allows no physical recovery of the body for propaganda purposes.

10. Pippa Middleton photographs are moved off the front pages of the tabloids.
But probably only briefly.